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RCRA Citizen Suits and Restitution: The
Eighth Circuit's Full Cort Press Strangles
Equity's Traditional Remedial Play
Furrer v. Brown'
I. TTRODUCTION
Congress creates a federalright of action for private citizens in two ways.
First, Congress can expressly grant this right in the statute's language.
Second, Congress can implicitly create a right of action. In Cort v. Ash,2 the
Supreme Court set forth a method of analyzing a statute to determine whether
Congress implied a private right of action.
As a separate matter, courts sometimes must determine the remedies
available to citizens who have an express or implied right of action under a
statute. In Davis v. Passman,3 the Supreme Court made it clear that Cort v.
Ash does not apply when the question solely concerns the nature of the
remedies available under a statute.' Nonetheless, courts continue to confuse
these two distinct questions. This Note will address Furrer v. Brown,5 a
recent decision highlighting the Eighth Circuit's confusion in the distinction
between finding an implicit right of action and determining the available
remedies for an existing right of action.
II. FACTS AND HoLDING
In 1982, J. Richard and Margaret Furrer purchased property from Donald
and Dorothy Brown and Louis and Geraldine Fagas.' Shell Oil Company
occupied and leased the property from 1933 until the mid-1970s and installed
underground gasoline storage tanks on the property In 1991, the Furrers
discovered that gasoline had leaked from the underground storage tanks at
1. 62 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 1995).
2. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
3. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
4. Id. at 241.
5. See Furrer, 62 F.3d 1092.
6. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1093.
7. Furrer, 62 F.3d 1093. It is clear that Shell leased the property from the
Browns and Fagases. It is unclear, however, if other persons owned the property
during Shell's lease period. See Appellant's Brief at 3-4, Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d
1092, 1093 (8th Cir. 1995)
1
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some time during Shell's occupancy.' The Missouri Department of Natural
Resources ordered the Furrers to remediate the contaminated property.' The
Furrers complied at a cost of over $260,000.0
The Furrers filed suit to recover their remediation costs in the United
States District Court Eastern District of Missouri." They named as
defendants the Browns and Fagases and Shell as the operator of the
underground tanks. a2 The Furrers sought equitable restitution based on the
citizen suit provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA)."
The district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 4 The Eighth
Circuit held that RCRA failed to expressly create a private cause of action for
8. Id. When the Furrers purchased the property on April 1, 1982, there were no
operative gasoline pumps on the property and there was no gasoline in the
underground tanks. See Appellant's Brief at 3-4, Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092 (8th
Cir. 1995).
9. Appellant's Brief at 4, Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 1995).
10. Appellant's Brief at 4, Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1093 (8th Cir. 1995).
11. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1093.
12. Id.
13. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988). The citizen suit provision reads in part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, any person may
commence a civil action on his own behalf...
(B) Against any person, including... any past or present generator,
past or present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a
treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or is
contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment; ...
... The district court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce [permits and other
such requirements], to restrain any person who has contributed or who is
contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste.., to order such
person to take such other action as may be necessary, or both ....
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1988).
The Furrers didnotbring suitunderthe Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994) because
CERCLA's definition of hazardous substance excludes "petroleum, including crude oil
or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a
hazardous substance." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1994).
14. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1093.
[Vol. 61
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the recovery of remediation costs. 5 The court then applied a Cort v. Ash
analysis 6 to determine whether Congress implicitly created a private cause
of action in RCRA." After considering the Cort factors,18 the court held
that RCRA did not implicitly create a private remedy for recovering cleanup
costs.19
Ia. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. When Courts Should Apply Cort v. Ash
Courts frequently display confusion in the application of the Cort v. Ash
analysis.2" The Supreme Court's analysis in Cort refers to the congressional
creation of a private cause of action.2' Yet courts often improperly rely on
the Cort analysis to determine whether Congress implicitly authorized a
specific type of relief in a statute that expressly grants a private cause of
action.22
In Davis v. Passman, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the
misunderstanding over the difference between a congressionally created cause
of action and the relief afforded under it.' The Fifth Circuit ruled in Davis,
based upon the factors set out in Cort, that the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment did not include an implied private right of action.24 The
15. Id. at 1094.
16. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Corttest applies four factors in assessingwhether
Congress intended to create an implied cause of action: 1) is the plaintiff one of the
class for whose especialbenefit the statute was enacted? 2) is there any indication of
legislative intent to create or deny such a remedy? 3) is it inconsistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy? 4) is the cause
of action traditionally relegated to state law, so that it would be inappropriate to infer
a cause of action based solely on federal law? Id. at 78.
17. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1094-1102.
18. See supra note 16.
19. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1100.
20. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See supra note 16 for the four factors. Cortinterpreted
a criminal statute that did not expressly provide for civil enforcement. This is
significant in that it infers that Cort should apply only when a statute fails to grant any
express right of actionto a private plaintiff. Nonetheless, the different meanings courts
have placed on "cause of action" have resulted in confusion.
21. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 237-38 (1979); or the entitlement to relief,
as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure call it. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
22. Davis, 442 U.S. at 238.
23. 442 U.S. 228 (1979); see also Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503
U.S. 60 (1992).
24. Davis, 442 U.S. at 232.
1996]
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Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment contains an implied right of action.' The Supreme Court in
Davis made clear that the question whether a private citizen has a cause of
action is analytically distinct from the question of what relief that cause of
action is afforded." The Davis court established two prerequisites to using
the Cort analysis. First, Congress must have enacted a statute which created
enforceable rights and obligations.' Second, the court must be deciding
whether a particular class of litigants can enforce those rights and
obligations.2"
The Supreme Court addressed this question again, as it relates to Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools.29 Because the Court previously recognized that the statute granted
a cause of action,3" the Court had to decide whether money damages served
as an appropriate remedy. 1 The Supreme Court did not use a Cort analysis
to decide this issue.32 Instead, the Franklin Court repeatedly referenced the
holding from Davis that determining if a cause of action exists is analytically
distinct from deciding what relief is available.3 The decision in Franklin
relied on the principle that if a right of action exists and Congress fails to
limit the enforcement powers of the courts, a federal court may order any
appropriate relief.3
4
25. Id. at 241. The Court further found that damages were an appropriate form
of relief. Id. at 248-49.
26. Id. at 239.
27. Id. at 239-40.
28. Id.
29. 503 U.S. 60, 62-63 (1992). The Supreme Court had previously recognized
a private right of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1991). See infranote 30. The question in Franklin was whether
the remedies available included monetary damages.
30. Title IX did not grant an express private right of action, but the Supreme
Court previously implied such an action in Cannonv. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677 (1979). This statute provides in part that "No person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected-to discriminationunder any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1991).
31. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 62-63 (1992).
32. Id. at76.
33. Id. at 65-66, 69.
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B. Equitable Powers of Federal District Courts
A principle deeply rooted in our legal system suggests that when
Congress invokes the equitable jurisdiction of courts, that jurisdiction includes
all inherent equitable powers." Congress, therefore, must explicitly limit the
scope of the equitable remedies available.36 Any inference of limitation must
be necessary and inescapable from the language of the statute.37 Describing
this equitable jurisdiction, the Supreme Court stated that the courts need the
power to mold each decree to the necessities of the particular case; this
requires flexibility rather than rigidity.38 These equitable powers assume an
even broader and more flexible character when the public interest is at
stake.
39
Equitable jurisdiction unquestionably includes injunctive powers.4"
Therefore, the Supreme Court often has held that a statute that invokes the
court's injunctive powers also invokes the full scope of equitable remedies.41
In Hecht Co. v. Bowles42 and Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,3 the Supreme
Court, based on the above principle, found that even if a statute says courts
"shall" issue an injunction for proven violations, courts have discretion to
decide the propriety of an injunction in each case."
35. See, e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944); Porter v.
Warner Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503
U.S. 60, 65-66 (1992).
36. Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329-30; Porter, 328 U.S. at 398; Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66.
37. Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329-30; Porter, 328 U.S. at 398; Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66.
38. Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329.
39. Id.; Porter, 328 U.S. at 398 (citing Virginian R. Co. v. System Fed., 300 U.S.
515, 552 (1937)).
40. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311 (1982).
41. See e.g., Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 313; Mitchell v. De Mario Jewelry,
Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291 (1960); United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 619 (1951);
Porter 328 U.S. at 398; Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329-30.
42. 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
43. 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982).
44. InHecht, the statute in questionwas § 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942 (56 Stat. 23, 50 U.S.C. App. Supp. IL §§ 901, 925) which provides that
upon a showing that a person was in violation of the statute, "a permanent or
temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order shall be granted without bond."
Hecht, 321 U.S. at 321-22.
In Romero-Barcelo,the statute was the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1251, with the same language as above. Again the Court upheld the
discretion of the district court saying that authorizing injunctive relief invoked the full
equitable powers of the courts. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 320.
1996]
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The scope of equitable jurisdiction encompasses much more than
discretion in implementing statutorily authorized remedies. Equitable powers
also allow district courts to grant equitable relief not mentioned in the
statute. 5 The Porter court, applying the analysis from Hecht Co., stated that
once a statute invokes equity, all equitable remedies are presumed available. 6
The fact that the statute authorized the court to grant any "other order"
necessary reinforced the Court's conclusion. 7 The Court said "the term
'other order' contemplates a remedy other than that of an injunction or
restraining order... [and an] order for.., restitution... may be considered
a proper 'other order."' 48
In United States v. Moore,49 the Court allowed restitution under a statute
that gave district courts jurisdiction to enjoin violative acts or to enter "an
order enforcing compliance."5  This case displayed an added facet of
equitable jurisdiction in that the Court awarded restitution even though the
district court failed to issue an injunction, the remedy that invoked equity in
the statute."
The cases discussed thus far have dealt with statutes that authorize
injunctions and "other orders." In addition, the Court has applied full
equitable powers through a statute that grants courts only the power to enjoin
and does not mention "other orders."52 In Mitchell, the statute gave district
courts injunctive power to restrain violations of the statute, but specifically
barred the courts from ordering the payment of unpaid minimum wages or
overtime wages. 3 Despite this limitation, the Court held that courts have the
45. Courts often cite as an example Porter v. Warner, 328 U.S. 395 (1946), which
dealt with the same statute as Hecht. See supra note 44. The Court later stated that
the equitable principles in both Hecht and Porter are not to be limited by the fact that
the statute considered was a wartime statute. They also are not to be limited on the
grounds that the Court found affirmative confirmation to order reimbursement in the
language of the statute. See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 291.
46. Porter, 328 U.S. at 398.
47. Id. at 399.
48. Id.
49. 340 U.S. 616 (1951).
50. Id. at 618. The action was brought under § 206(b) of the Housing and Rent
Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 1881-1910 (Supp. IV 1951).
51. Moore, 340 U.S. at 619-21.
52. See Mitchell v. De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291 (1960).
53. Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 289. Secretary of Labor Mitchell brought the action
under § 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 217. This section
clearly gave district courts the power to enjoin violations of § 15 of the Act. The
question was whether the equitable jurisdiction invoked through § 17 empowered a
court to order reimbursement of lost wages.
494 [Vol. 61
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authority to order the payment of lost wages under the statute. 4 Similarly,
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits found full equitable powers under a statute only
authorizing injunctive relief.55
These cases highlight the fact that when Congress invokes a district
court's equitable jurisdiction, the court should not imply any limitation on that
jurisdiction absent a clear declaration from Congress to that effect. The Court
in Hecht stated that a departure from several hundred years of history requires
an unequivocal statement of that purpose.5 6 Porter stressed that "unless
otherwise provided by statute, all the inherent equitable powers of the District
Court are available for the proper and complete exercise of that
jurisdiction. "5' The Porter Court further stated that courts should not deny
or limit the comprehensiveness of equitable jurisdiction without a clear and
valid legislative command.5
Courts, however, sometimes infer limitations on the equitable remedies
available under a statutory right of action. These courts reason that when
Congress intends to grant a certain power or discretion to district courts, it
does so specifically. In other words, if Congress intended the desired remedy
in the disputed statute, it would have said so explicitly. 9 For example, in
Mitchell, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's reasoning that the
statute must expressly confer or necessarily imply the equitable power
sought.6 In Hecht, Porter and Mitchell, the Supreme Court rejected this
approach." The Court stated in Hecht, "[w]e cannot but think that if
Congress had intended to make such a drastic departure from the traditions of
equity practice, an unequivocal statement of its purpose would have been
made."62 Thus, to limit equity by inference, the inference must be necessary
54. Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 296. The Court said that the statute barred recoupment
of underpayments but not unpaid wages. Id. at 294-95. Mitchell clearly demonstrates
how specifically Congress must limit the equitable powers of courts once invoked.
55. FTC v. Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 665 F.2d 711, 717 (5th Cir. 1982); FTC v.
Security Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1314 (8th Cir. 1991). The statute
interpreted in both cases was the Federal Trade Commission Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 53(b) (1976).
56. Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329-30. Mitchell also states that when Congress invokes
the equitable powers of the court, it must be assumed that they have acted cognizant
of this historic power of equity to provide complete relief. Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292.
57. Porterv. Warner, 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946).
58. Id.
59. The Furrercourt relies on this argument. See Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092,
1096 (8th Cir. 1995).
60. Mitchell v. De Mario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 290 (1960).
61. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944); Porter v. Warner, 328 U.S.
395, 398 (1946); Mitchell v. De Mario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 295 (1960).
62. Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329.
1996]
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and inescapable from the language of the statute.6' The Mitchell Court
subsequently explained that Porter laid down the proper criterion for
determining the scope of equitable remedies." Porter requires a necessary
and inescapable inference to limit not to grant equitable jurisdiction.6"
In 1991, in Pierce v. Amaral,6 the Eighth Circuit applied this traditional
equitable jurisdiction analysis to an action brought under the Interstate Land
Sales Full Disclosure Act.67 The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the state and ordered an injunction, disgorgement of profits, an
appointment of a receiver and ordered the defendants to submit annual
financial statements to assist the court in enforcing the judgment.68 Except
for the injunction, the statute failed to expressly authorize any of these
equitable remedies.69 Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's actions.7" The Eighth Circuit first found that by authorizing an
injunction, section 1714(a) invoked the district court's equitable
jurisdiction.71  The court then cited Porter and an earlier Eighth Circuit
opinion for the proposition that invoking a court's equitable powers invokes
all inherent equitable powers unless the statute explicitly or by necessary and
inescapable inference limits the scope of that jurisdiction.72
63. Porter, 328 U.S. at 398.
64. Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 290.
65. Porter, 358 U.S. at 398.
66. Pierce v. Amaral, 938 F.2d 94, 95 (8th Cir. 1991).
67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1988); the enforcement sectionwas § 1714(a) which
reads in pertinent part:
Whenever it shall appear to the Secretary [of Housing and Urban
Development] that any person is engaged.., in any acts or practices which
constitute... a violation of the provisions of this chapter,. . . he may, in
his discretion, bring an action in any district court of the United States...
to enjoin such acts or practices, and, upon a proper showing, a permanent
or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be issued without
bond....
The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development brought the enforcement
action for violations of the Act's registration, disclosure and sales practice provisions.
Pierce, 938 F.2d at 95.
68. Pierce, 938 F.2d at 95.
69. See supra note 67.
70. Pierce, 938 F.2d at 96.
71. Id. at 95.
72. Id. (citing FTC v. Security Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1314
(8th Cir 1991); Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946); Mitchell v.
De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 290-92 (1960)).
[Vol. 61
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Some argue that the Supreme Court has withdrawn from some of the
broad language of older cases. 3 In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools, Justice Scalia summarized the rationale for limiting the scope of
equitable remedies.74 He stated that "when rights of action are judicially
'implied,' categorical limitations upon their remedial scope may be judicially
implied as well."'75 The restrictions on the availability of equitable remedies
apply if a statute fails to expressly grant a private citizen any right of action
to enforce the rights or obligations contained in the statute.76 These
restrictions do not apply when a court decides the scope of remedies available
under an expressly granted private right of action. 7
This discretion in applying equitable powers is limited by the
purpose of the enforcing statute. An equitable remedy must be reasonably
appropriate and necessaryto enforce compliance with the statute and effectuate
its purposes.7" Courts must act primarily to effectuate the policy of the
statute.79 The presumption, however, is profoundly in favor of full equitable
jurisdiction."0 The cases discussed above demonstrate that the equitable
jurisdiction of courts is a viable doctrine that has maintained the necessary
qualities of flexibility, mercy and practicality.81
73. See George W. Dent, Jr., Ancillary Relief in FederalSecurities Law: A Study
in FederalRemedies, 67 MniN. L. REv.. 865, 885 (1983). Dent points to a "literalist"
approach to reading statutes as opposed to a "purposive" approach. He recognizes,
however, that this view is often stated in minority opinions and still must rely on the
purpose of the statute and historical equitable principles.





78. United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 619 (1951).
79. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 400 (1946).
80. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
81. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944); Pierce v. Amaral, 938 F.3d
94, 96 (8th Cir. 1991).
1996]
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C. Conflicting Decisions: KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig'
1. Ninth Circuit's Treatment
8 3
In a case decided six months before Furrer, the Ninth Circuit, in KFC
Western, Inc., v. Meghrig, addressed the same question as Furrer but reached
the opposite result.8 4 Ironically, the Ninth Circuit did so relying on two
Eighth Circuit decisions.8 5
In KFC, the plaintiffs purchased contaminated property 6 and the Los
Angeles Department of Health Services ordered the plaintiffs to clean up the
property. Three years later the plaintiffs sought restitution for the clean up
costs.' The Ninth Circuit first stated that RCRAs "imminent and substantial
endangerment" provisions allowed suits with respect to contamination that
posed an imminent and substantial danger at some point in the past.89
The court then held that RCRA authorized a restitutionary remedy for
private citizens to collect clean up costs.9" It found this authority in the
statutory language authorizing "such other action as may be necessary."91
The court cited as persuasive authority the Eighth Circuit's holdings in Aceto
and Northeastern Pharmaceutical.' In those cases, the Eighth Circuit found
that the language in RCRA section 7003, which is nearly identical to the
82. 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995).
83. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Meghrig v. KFC
Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996); see infranotes 95-106 and accompanying text.
The Ninth Circuit's treatment remains relevant in that the Eighth Circuit decided
Furrer against the background of the Ninth Circuit's decision, not the Supreme
Court's.
84. KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995).
85. Id. The Ninth Circuit relied on the following Eighth Circuit opinions: United
States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989) and United States
v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
86. KFC, 49 F.3d at 519.
87. Id.
88. See supra note 13.
89. KFC, 49 F.3d at 521. The court relied on the Eighth Circuit's reading of
"imminent and substantial danger" in RCRA § 7003, which authorizes suits by the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. Id. (citing Aceto, 872 F.2d at
1383). Section 7003 is worded nearly identical to § 6972(a)(1)(B), the citizen suit
provision. Id.
90. KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 521 (9th Cir. 1995).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 521-22. See also supra note 85.
[Vol. 61
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language in section 6972, authorized the government to recover under
equitable remedies not expressly in the statute.93
While the Ninth Circuit did not couch its holding in the equitable
jurisdiction terms of Porter or Hecht, it clearly recognized that the
authorization for plaintiffs "to take such other action as may be necessary"
invokes broader powers of the courts than simply injunctive relief.94
2. The Supreme Court's Decision
In an unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
stating that KFC's claim failed for two reasons.95 First, KFC did not bring
the claim while the hazardous waste presented an "imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment."96  Second, RCRA did not
contemplate the recovery of past cleanup costs.
97
The Court gave several justifications for refusing the recovery of past
cleanup costs under RCRA. According to the Court, a "plain reading" of the
remedial language of section 6972(a) 9' allowed only two remedies.99 A
private citizen could seek a "mandatory injunction" which orders a responsible
party to attend to the cleanup and disposal of toxic waste or a "prohibitory
injunction" which restrained a responsible party from further violating
RCRA.100
The Court also relied on the differences between the CERCLA and
RCRA citizen suit provisions.01 The Court relied on the maxim that since
Congress knew how to provide for the recovery of cleanup costs in CERCLA
the absence of such a provision in RCRA meant that Congress did not intend
for recovery of past cleanup costs under RCRA. 1'
The Court gave several justifications related to the timing provisions in
RCRA. The Court pointed to a lack of a statute of limitations on citizen suits,
93. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1383; NortheasternPharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 738.
94. KFC, 49 F.3d at 521.
95. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1254 (1996).
96. Id. (quoting RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B)). Failing this requirement is enough to
deny KFC recovery; therefore, the Court's opinion regarding the remedies available
under RCRA is not necessary to the judgment.
97. Id.
98. See supra note 13.
99. Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. at 1254.
100. Id. at 1254-1255.
101. Id. CERCLA expressly provides that "any person may seek contribution
from any other personwho is liable or potentially liable" for cleanup costs. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(l)(1).
102. Id. at 1255.
1996]
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reasoning that the imminent danger requirement placed a timing limitation on
RCRA citizen suits in that such suits could be brought only while the danger
was imminent. Also, the Court pointed out that a ninety day waiting period
could create an anomaly such that only the smaller hazardous waste sites could
recover cleanup costs.1"
Finally, the Court superficially addressed the equitable powers issue. The
Court acknowledged that "district courts retain inherent authority to award any
equitable remedy that is not expressly restricted by Congress."1"4 The Court
then stated that the preservation of statutory and common law remedies, the
"limited" remedies described in section 6972(a) and the differences between
CERCLA and RCRA's citizen suit provisions "amply demonstrate that
Congress did not intend for a private citizen to be able to undertake a clean
up and then proceed to recover its costs under RCRA."' °5 In a final shot,
the Court said that where Congress has provided "elaborate enforcement
provisions" a court "must be chary of reading others into it."1"6
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Furrer v. Brown, the Eighth Circuit began its analysis by looking to
the language of section 6972, the citizen suit provision of RCRA.1°1 The
court found no express authority to award money judgments for costs incurred
in cleaning up contaminated sites."0 Therefore, the court stated that a
remedy must be found implicitly through the authority "to order ... such
other action as may be necessary" or through federal common law."0 9 The
103. Id. A private party must give ninety days notice to the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, the state in which the alleged endangerment
occurred and to potential defendants before bringing a suit. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6972(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii). No citizen suit can proceed if either the EPA or the state is
diligently prosecuting an enforcement action. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(b)(2)(B) and (C).
The anomaly this creates, according to the Court, is that "[t]hose parties with
insubstantialproblems, problems that neither the State nor the Federal government feel
compelled to address, could recover their response costs, whereas those parties whose
waste problems were sufficiently severe as to attract the attention of Government
officials would be left without a recovery."
104. Id. at 1256 (citing Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946);
Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); Hecht Co. v. Bowles,
321 U.S. 321 (1944)).
105. Id.
106. Id. (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981)).
107. Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1094 (8th Cir. 1995).
108. Id. See supra note 13:
109. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1094. By "federal common law," the Furrer court was
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court reasoned that no remedy would be available unless Congress intended
to authorize a monetary remedy for private citizens when it amended RCRA
in 1984.11' In searching for this intent, the court applied a Cort v. Ash"'
analysis.
112
Cort and its progeny set out four factors that the Furrer court utilized to
determine whether an implied cause of action existed under RCRA."'
Under its Cort analysis, the Furrer court first determined that section 6972
benefits all American citizens and that Congress did not enact the statute for
the "special benefit" of the Furrers."4 Second, the Furrer court found
RCRA's legislative history ambiguous and unhelpful in determining whether
Congress intended to authorize this type of remedy.' The court did not
want to imply a cause of action from congressional silence. 6
The Furrer court stated that the analysis could end here denying the
Furrers action; but, out of caution, the court discussed the remaining two Cort
factors.1 1 7  The court found that allowing landowners who clean up
contaminated property to seek restitution from the contaminating landowners
is not necessary to accomplish the congressional purpose of RCRA.1' s The
court stated that "RCRA's goal is to prevent the creation of hazardous waste
sites, rather than to promote the cleanup of existing sites." '  They
summarized their policy findings by stating: "[iln conclusion, we cannot say
that the purposes of environmental law and of § 6972 would be served by
providing for a monetary remedy in a citizen suit under § 6972.11120
Under the final factor of the Cort analysis, if state law traditionally
regulates the cause of action, the court will not find an implied federal cause
referring to case law which had exercised judicial power to "fashion appropriate
remedies for unlawful conduct." Id. (citing Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 90 (1981)). The court did not discuss whether federal
common law granted jurisdiction because the parties did not rely on this source of
authority. Id.
110. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1094.
111. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
112. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1094.
113. Id. at 1094-95. (citing Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992)). For
the four factors, see supra note 16.
114. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1095.
115. Id. at 1097.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1099.
119. Id. at 1098.
120. Id. at 1099.
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of action."' Congress preserved relevant state remedies under section
6972(f) and evidence existed from the legislative history that Congress did not
want citizen suits to become overwhelmed by the search for private state law
remedies."' Therefore, the court found this to be at best a neutral
factor.1
The Furrers argued that by authorizing courts to grant injunctive relief,
Congress invoked the full equitable powers of the court, including the power
to grant equitable restitution.1 24 They believed Congress expressly granted
this power through the authority "to order.., such other action as may be
necessary."'" The court did not agree, stating that the Furrers read too
much into the statute.126  The court primarily based this finding on two
factors. First, they relied on cases that urged caution in expanding remedies
when Congress has provided for specific remedies.'21 Second, the court
pointed to other statutes where Congress expressly granted similar relidf,
demonstrating that if Congress intended to do so here, they would have.12 8
The court stated that 'Jurisdiction 'to enforce' or 'to restrain' does not
encompass the authority to award monetary relief.1
129
The Furrer court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's decision in KFC.'30
The court did not believe that the cases cited in KFC supported finding a
monetary remedy for landowners.' The court pointed out that both Eighth
Circuit cases relied on by KFC failed to specifically address subject matter
jurisdiction.12
The Furrer court concluded that all four factors from Cort prevented an
implied private cause of action under the citizen suit provision of RCRA.3
The court directly disagreed with the Ninth Circuit, concluding that KFC
began with a faulty premise and mis-analyzed the question.'34
121. Id. (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
122. Id. at 1099-1100.
123. Id. at 1100.
124. Id. at 1095. See also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
125. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1095.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1096.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1100 (disagreeing with KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518
(9th Cir. 1995)).
131. Id. at 1100-01.
132. Id. at 1101.
133. Id. at 1100.
134. District Judge Bennett "unreservedly" concurred. He wanted to emphasize
that the role of federal courts was as interpreter of statutes, not as policy makers or
[Vol. 61
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In Furrer, the Eighth Circuit faced the question of whether innocent
landowners who complied with the cleanup mandates of the Missouri
Department of Natural Resources could sue under RCRA for restitution of
those cleanup costs from the culpable parties."' The plaintiffs brought the
action under RCRA which specifically allows private citizens to sue for an
injunction or "other action." '136 According to "several hundred years of
history," '137 recent decisions of the Supreme Court and even the Eighth
Circuit's own decisions, the "other order" language should be enough to
satisfy subject matter jurisdiction. 38
Congress expressly granted the Furrers a right of action to enforce the
rights and obligations created under RCRA.139 Congress invoked the full
range of equitable remedies by authorizing injunctive relief.' Once
invoked, Congress must limit the court's equitable jurisdiction explicitly.' 4'
Courts can not infer any limitation on this equitable jurisdiction unless the
limitation is necessary and inescapable from the language of the statute. 4'
Instead of limiting the court's equitable jurisdiction, Congress clearly granted
the court full discretion by authorizing "other orders" as necessary. 3
Congress explicitly appealed to the discretion of the district court.
The Furrer court asked the question: "Did Congress intend to authorize
a monetary remedy for private citizens under section 6972?"' 1 This query
combines two analytically distinct questions. First: "Did Congress intend to
authorize a private right of action under section 6972?" If the answer to the
enlargers of congressional intent. Id. at 1102.
Circuit Judge Fagg dissented in a brief opinion. Id. Relying upon the reasons
stated by the Ninth Circuit in KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, the dissent would allow
an innocent private purchaser of contaminated property to bring an equitable action for
reimbursement of cleanup costs. Id. He "readily agree[d] with the Ninth Circuit that
'it would be unfair and poor public policy to interpret § 6972(a)(1)(B) as barring
restitution actions."' Id.
135. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1093.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). For text of the statute, see supra note 13.
137. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
138. Subject matter jurisdiction should be satisfied in that the statute invoked the
district court's equitable jurisdiction. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 13.
140. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 13 for the text of the statute.
144. See generally Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1094 (8th Cir. 1995).
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first question is "yes," the second question is: "Is a monetary remedy
available under this right of action?"
Because the citizen suit provision of RCRA expressly grants a private
right of action, the answer to the first question should be undeniably
"yes".'45 Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit applied a Cort v. Ash analysis,
attempting to answer the first question,'46 but Cort applies only if Congress
did not expressly grant a private right of action.'47
Since Congress expressly granted the Furrers a right of action, the Eighth
Circuit should have looked to the language of the statute to see if Congress
expressly or by necessary and inescapable inference limited the scope of the
court's equitable jurisdiction.4 If Congress did not do so, the district court
has the power to grant any equitable remedy that is reasonably appropriate.
The language of the statute only limits the equitable jurisdiction of the court
to those orders that "may be necessary." This is the very boundary that courts
have placed on equitable jurisdiction throughout history.
145. See supra note 13.
146. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1095.
147. Indeed that is exactly how the Eighth Circuit has always applied it in the
past. See, e.g., McMasterv. Minnesota, 30 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1116 (1995); Marshallv. Green Giant Co., 942 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1991); Zajac
v. Federal Land Bank, 909 F.2d 1181 (8th Cir. 1990); Roberts v. Wamser, 883 F.2d
617 (8th Cir. 1989); Tallarico v. TWA, (8th Cir. 1989); Amin Gonzalez v. U.S. INS,
867 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1989); FSLIC v. Capozzi, 855 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1988);
Campillo v. Sullivan, 853 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082
(1989); Redd v. Federal Land Bank, 851 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1988); Arcoren v. Peters,
811 F.2d 392 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 987 (1988); Hill v. Group Three
Hous. Dev. Corp., 799 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1986); Shidler v. All American Life & Fin.
Corp., 775 F.2d 917 (8th Cir. 1985); Wilsonv. Mason State Bank, 738 F.2d 343 (8th
Cir. 1984); Crawford v. Janldow, 710 F.2d 1321 (8th Cir. 1983); Hofbauer v.
Northwestern Natl. Bank, 700 F.2d 1197 (8th Cir. 1983); Mienerv. Missouri, 673 F.2d
969 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982); McCabe v. City of Eureka, 664 F.2d
680 (8th Cir. 1981); Simon v. St. Louis County, 656 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982); Cedar-Riversides Assocs. v. City of Minneapolis, 606
F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1979); Abbeyv. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Gabauer v. Woodcock, 594 F.2d 662 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841 (1979); General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d
1211 (8th Cir. 1978),judgmentvacatedby, 441 U.S. 919 (1979); Girardier v. Webster
College, 563 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1977); Wentworth v. Solem, 548 F.2d 773 (8th Cir.
1977); Jones v. United States, 536 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1039 (1977).
148. This search does not include legislative intent. Intent is superfluous. If
Congress has not expressly or specifically limited equity, all remedies are available.
See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
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In reaching its decision in Furrer, the court did not address Pierce, an
extremely similar case. 49 Instead, the Eighth Circuit silently retreated from
the traditional scope of equitable jurisdiction enunciated in Pierce. The most
glaring retreat from traditional equitable jurisdiction by the Furrer court was
their statement that 'jurisdiction 'to enforce' or 'to restrain' does not
encompass the authority to award monetary relief."150 This statement
directly contradicts the Supreme Court holding in Porter."'
The court based its reasoning on the maxim that a court should be
"chary" of creating causes of action when Congress could have done so and
did not.'52 The Supreme Court in Hecht rejected this argument when
applied to the scope of equitable jurisdiction.'53 In matters of equity,
tradition must prevail.15 When Congress invokes equity, courts must
assume Congress did so aware of the powers historically invoked.'55 Courts
must assume that Congress knew that in order to limit the scope of this
jurisdiction, it must do so explicitly.'56 Therefore, by allowing restitution,
a district court would not be creating a new cause of action not anticipated by
Congress as the Furrer court contends. Such an equitable remedy is well
within the bounds of equitable precedent.
Using a Cort v. Ash analysis in Furrer allowed the Eighth Circuit to
circumvent the history of equity as applied by the Supreme Court and the
Eighth Circuit themselves. Without even addressing it, Furrer drastically
curtailed the historical power of the district courts.
The Eighth Circuit's approach of silently circumventing prior case law
and equitable tradition has found implicit approval. The Supreme Court in
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. avoided the misapplication of Cort, but did not
give adequate consideration to the equitable argument raised in KFC."' The
Court cited the traditional view of a court's equitable powers by saying once
149. See supra note 67. In fact, RCRA presents a stronger argument for full
equitable powers in that Congress has authorized "other action."
150. Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1096.
151. Porter specifically stated that equitable restitution is a proper "other order."
See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
152. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1096.
153. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.,
154. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 57.
156. See supra note 57.
157. That may be explained by the fact that the case could have been disposed
of as not timely filed. See supra note 96 (suit must be filed while an "imminent and
substantial danger" exists). However, given that the Court purports to have addressed
this issue, the Court will not likely re-examine the issue by hearing the Furrer case.
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invoked, Congress must expressly limit equitable remedies. 5 ' However, the
Court apparently decided that several circumstantial factors can add up to an
express limitation.'59 Just as in Furrer, this represents a silent limitation on
the traditional equitable powers of courts.
By only implicitly limiting the courts' equitable jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court now has two avenues available for answering any equitable jurisdiction
issue. Under the guise of limiting its equitable powers, the Court has created
an easy escape from tough equitable issues while retaining its previous,
unlimited equitable powers. The next time the Court is faced with a private
plaintiff who is seeking a remedy under a federal statute, the Court may
invoke Porter v. Warner and find full equitable powers or it may invoke
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. and proclaim the absence of authority to grant
relief.
VI. CONCLUSION
Traditional equitable jurisdiction has developed over hundreds of years.
The Supreme Court consistently has upheld the traditional method of invoking
equitable jurisdiction and it consistently has upheld the traditional scope of
equitable jurisdiction. In a sudden departure from this tradition, the Eighth
Circuit limited the equitable remedies available to a district court to those
remedies expressly provided for and those that meet the criteria in Cort v. Ash.
The Furrer court effectively overrules Pierce v. Amaral and the traditional
analysis it espoused. The Furrer court has also broadened the application of
the Cort analysis. After Furrer, a district court must apply Cort to search for
Congressional intent to grant a certain remedy to a private plaintiff, not just
to find Congressional intent to create a private right of action.
The Supreme Court followed the Eighth Circuit's lead and ignored its
prior decisions and equitable tradition in KFC. While ostensibly limiting its
equitable jurisdiction, the Court has actually expanded its power. The Court
has not overruled Hecht, Porter, et al.; therefore, full equitable authority once
invoked remains available. However, Furrer and KFC could also be relied on
to limit equitable jurisdiction without express limitation. The next private
plaintiff to face this issue will not know which way the courts may go.
DAViD A. VANDYKE
158. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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